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European Central Bank working paper series 53Abstract
Previous studies have interpreted the rise and fall of U.S. ination after World
War II in terms of the Fed's changing views about the natural rate hypothesis but
have left an important question unanswered. Why was the Fed so slow to implement
the low-ination policy recommended by a natural rate model even after economists
had developed statistical evidence strongly in its favor? Our answer features model
uncertainty. Each period a central bank sets the systematic part of the ination rate
in light of updated probabilities that it assigns to three competing models of the
Phillips curve. Cautious behavior induced by model uncertainty can explain why the
central bank presided over the ination of the 1970s even after the data had convinced
it to place much the highest probability on the natural rate model.
4
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 478
April 2005
JEL classification: E31, E58, E65.  
Keywords: natural unemployment rate; Phillips curve; Bayes' law; anticipated utility;   
robustness1 Introduction
This paper uses a model of an adaptive monetary authority to interpret the rise
and fall of U.S. ination in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.1 Following DeLong (1997),
Taylor (1997), and Sargent (1999), we explore whether the rise and fall of U.S. in-
ation can be attributed to policy makers' changing beliefs about the natural rate
hypothesis. One story that emphasizes changing beliefs goes as follows. Samuelson
and Solow (1960) taught policy makers that there was an exploitable long-run trade-
o between ination and unemployment, and ination rose as the authorities tried
to exploit the tradeo. But that misguided policy experiment generated observations
that taught the authorities the natural rate hypothesis, which eventually convinced
them to reduce ination.
The adverb \eventually" signicantly qualies this story because the data in-
dicate that the authorities should have learned the natural rate model long before
they acted on it. Sims (2001) and Cogley and Sargent (2001) demonstrate that the
natural rate hypothesis should have been learned by the early 1970s, yet ination re-
mained high until the early 1980s.2 If the rise and fall of U.S. ination reected only
changing beliefs about the natural rate hypothesis, and not, say, altered purposes or
decision making arrangements, then it is puzzling that ination remained high for
a decade after substantial statistical evidence favoring the natural rate hypothesis
had accumulated. By the early 1970s, average ination was on the rise, yet average
unemployment had not fallen, contrary to the Samuelson-Solow model. The events
of the early 1970s turned the economics profession away from the Samuelson-Solow
model. Why did policy makers wait a decade to act on this lesson?
A number of alternative explanations for the high U.S. ination of the 1970s
refrain from assigning an important role to policy makers' changing beliefs about
1The model is what David Kreps (1998) called an anticipated utility model. In an anticipated
utility model, a decision maker recurrently maximizes the expected utility of a stream of future
outcomes with respect to a model that is recurrently reestimated. Although an anticipated utility
agent optimizes and learns, he does not purposefully experiment. But as data accrue, he adapts and
possibly even respecies the model that he uses to evaluate expected utility.
2Sims credits Albert Ando for rst making this point.
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of Arthur Burns. Parkin (1993) and Ireland (1999) say that discretionary policy
making combined with a higher natural rate of unemployment resulted in a higher
inationary bias. Chari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum (1998) and Albanesi, Chari,
and Christiano (2003) ascribe the high ination to an expectations trap. Orphanides
(2003), Lansing (1999), and Romer and Romer (2002) emphasize that the Federal
Reserve was slow to detect the productivity slowdown and the rise in the natural
rate of unemployment.3 Primiceri (2003) emphasizes evolution in the Fed's estimates
not only of the natural rate but also of the slope of the short-term trade-o between
ination and unemployment.4 We believe that there is some truth in all of these ideas
but explore a dierent explanation. We show that concerns about the robustness of a
proposed ination-stabilization policy across alternative models would have induced
policy makers to choose high ination even though the data favored a model that
recommended low ination.5
Our calculations conrm that by the mid 1970s, zero ination would have been
optimal according to the model that was most probable among the ones that we
consider. But because the optimal policy takes model uncertainty into account via
Bayesian model averaging, that was not enough to convince our Bayesian policy maker
to abstain from trying to exploit the Phillips curve. In two competing models that had
smaller but still non-zero probability weights, a policy of quickly reducing ination
would have been calamitous. If very bad results are associated with a particular policy
according to any of the models that retain a positive but small posterior probability,
our Bayesian policy maker refrains from that policy. When outcomes from following a
recommendation to stabilize ination become worse under some particular worst-case
model, the ultimate decisions tend to track the recommendations of that worst-case
3See Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) and Velde (2004) for critical surveys of these and other
theories of the Great Ination. See John Taylor (2002) for an account that emphasizes the Fed's
learning about theories of the natural unemployment rate.
4Erceg and Levin (2003) investigate how the public's learning about the Fed's motives can explain
the recession that accompanied the reduction of ination that the Fed engineered under Paul Volcker.
5Blinder (1998, p. 12-13) recounts how he used multiple models to evaluate alternative policies
when he was Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
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of the 1970s reected the Fed's desire to guard against the bad outcomes that would
have come from a low-ination policy under models that by the 1970s should have
had low posterior probabilities.
2 Learning and policy making with multiple ap-
proximating models
2.1 Preliminary adaptive setup with a single approximating
model
We model the U.S. monetary authority as an adaptive decision maker like ones
described by Kreps (1998) and Sargent (1999) in the context of models of the Phillips
curve like ones in Sargent (1999), augmented with features that introduce a concern
for robustness to model uncertainty. The models in Sargent's monograph work as
follows. In truth, but unbeknownst to the central bank, a natural rate version of a
Phillips curve relates unemployment to surprise ination,
ut   u

t =  (yt   xt) + (L)ut 1 + t; (1)
where ut is unemployment, u
t is the natural rate, yt is actual ination, xt is both the
systematic part of ination and the rate of ination expected by the public, and t is
an iid normal shock with mean zero and variance 2
: The central bank sets xt with
a decision rule that is described below; xt is related to actual ination according to
yt = xt + t; (2)
where t is an iid normal shock with mean zero and variance 2
:
The central bank does not know equation (1), and instead bases its decisions on
a statistical approximating model,
Yt = X
0
t + t; (3)
where Xt and Yt represent generic right- and left-hand variables in a regression, and
 is a vector of regression parameters.
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subject to a constraint implied by its time t 1 estimates of model (3). This induces
a best-response mapping from the loss function and the time t   1 estimates of the
parameters of its approximating model to those of a time t policy rule, the rst
period outcome of which is a time t policy action xt. To emphasize its dependence on
predetermined state variables and parameter estimates, we denote it as xtjt 1: The
policy action xt = xtjt 1 inuences outcomes through equation (1). After observing
outcomes Yt;Xt at t, the central bank re-estimates the parameters of its policy model
(equation (3)), preparing to repeat the same decision process in the next period.
As the central bank's beliefs (i.e., the parameters of its approximating model)
evolve with the accumulation of data, so too does its policy rule.
2.2 Our three-model model
In contrast to Sargent (1999), we take no stand on the true data generating process.
We drop Sargent's (1999) assumption that the central bank has a unique approximat-
ing model and instead assume that the central bank acknowledges multiple models.7
Model uncertainty aects the bank's deliberations and induces a Bayesian form of
robustness of decision rules at least across the domain of alternative models that are
on the table. Our central bank adopts a `blue-collar' version of the approach to policy
making presented in Brock, Durlauf, and West (2003).
We choose three approximating models to represent Phillips curve specications
that have been inuential since the mid to late 1960's. The rst model allows a
permanently exploitable Phillips curve, the second a temporarily exploitable one,
6Our linear-quadratic framework abstracts from concerns about the zero bound on nominal in-
terest rates. That could make preferences asymmetric with respect to ination and deation and
cause policy makers to set an ination target above zero.
7The sense in which the central bank has `a model' is as a weighted average across several models.
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The rst statistical model is inspired by Samuelson and Solow (1960),
yt = 0 + 1(L)yt 1 + 2(L)ut + 1t; (5)
where 1t is iid N(0;2
1): Its key feature is that it permits a long-run tradeo unless
the parameter values take special congurations. We assume that the central bank
considers an unrestricted parameter conguration in order to allow the possibility
of a long-run trade-o. The bank also makes the identifying assumption that 1t is
orthogonal to the right side variables, including current unemployment.8 This makes
equation (5) a regression.
Model 2 is a restricted form of model 1, inspired by Solow's (1968) and Tobin's
(1968) suggestion about how to represent the natural rate hypothesis:
yt = 1(L)yt 1 + 2(L)(ut   u

t) + 2t: (6)
Like the Samuelson-Solow model, this features an exploitable short-run tradeo be-
tween ination and unemployment, but it recognizes a distinction between actual
unemployment and the natural rate, and it imposes Solow and Tobin's version of
long-run neutrality. The restriction that the intercept is zero and that the sum of
the lag weights on yt equals one enforces that the long-run Phillips curve is verti-
cal, located at u
t if the roots of 2(L) are outside the unit circle. We assume that
the authorities make the identifying assumption that 2t is uncorrelated with current
unemployment, so that equation (6) is also a regression.
Our third model is inspired by Lucas (1972) and Sargent (1973), and it enforces
both long-run neutrality and a policy ineectiveness proposition,
ut   u

t = 1(yt   xtjt 1) + 2(L)(ut 1   u

t 1) + 3t: (7)
8Sargent (1999) had more success tracking actual ination with this `Keynesian' direction of
t. In contrast, a `classical' direction of t would put unemployment on the left-hand side, as in
equation (1). See King and Watson (1994) and Sargent (1999) for background on how the direction
of t matters for the properties of Phillips curves. By adopting the model of government learning
of Sargent and Williams (2003), Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004) obtain much better econometric
explanations of the U.S. ination path than were obtained by Sargent (1999).
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updating estimates of this model, the latent variable xtjt 1 is measured recursively as
the optimal policy of a Bayesian linear regulator who solves a discounted quadratic
control problem, taking all three approximating models into account. We describe
how the bank chooses xtjt 1 in detail below.
This model also reverses the direction of t, putting unemployment on the left
side and ination on the right. When entertaining this representation, the central
bank makes the identifying assumption that 3t is orthogonal to current ination.
This identifying assumption diers from those of the other two models, but what
matters for statistical updating is the internal logic of each. Thus, we can proceed
with regression updates for this model as well.
As we demonstrate later, the assumption that the Keynesian models are estimated
with a Keynesian direction of t is important for our story because it inuences
estimates of sacrice ratios. Models estimated in the Keynesian direction imply a
high sacrice ratio in the 1970s, while those estimated in a classical direction predict
a low sacrice ratio. We could incorporate uncertainty about the direction of t
by expanding our three-model model to include versions of the Samuelson-Solow
and Solow-Tobin models estimated with a classical direction of t. But this seems
revisionist, and in any case does not alter the results. Policy choices for the ve-model
model are essentially the same as those for the three-model model.9 Accordingly, we
focus on the more parsimonious three-model representation.
Associated with each model and date is a posterior probability, it; i = 1;2;3.
We assume the authorities entertain no other possibilities, so 1t + 2t + 3t = 1 for
all t: One obvious shortcoming of this approach is the assumption of an exhaustive
list of explicitly specied possible models. This has led Hansen and Sargent (2001
and 2002) and others to specify a single approximating model, to surround it with an
uncountable cloud of alternative models each of whose entropy relative to the approx-
imating model is bounded, and to use a minimax decision rule because the decision
9This happens because the additional models do not alter the identity of the `worst-case' model.
The signicance of this fact will become clear later on.
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and Sargent's robust decision maker and his continuum of vaguely specied models,
our three-model decision maker knows much more. He can construct a posterior over
his three models, then make decisions by an appropriate form of model averaging.
Nevertheless, a minimax avor emerges from our Bayesian calculations with three
models.
The central bank's decision process is similar to the one in Sargent's (1999) model
that we described above, but with an extra step. At each date t, the central bank
implements the action xtjt 1 recommended by last period's policy rule. Next, it gets
new data yt;ut and updates the estimates of each of its three models according to
Bayes' theorem. It also recalculates the model weights it by evaluating the marginal
likelihood associated with each model. Then it re-optimizes in light of its revised
view of the world, preparing a contingency plan xt+1jt for the next period.10
Notice that with this timing protocol, the Lucas-Sargent model always recom-
mends xtjt 1 = 0. There is no ination bias because the central bank moves rst,
setting policy for date t based on information available at t 1, and there is no reason
to vary xtjt 1 to stabilize ut because systematic policy is neutral. Because variation
10The observational equivalence of natural and unnatural rate models pointed out by Sargent
(1976) pertains to our calculations in an important way. Using the Wold decomposition theorem,
Sargent demonstrated that under a time-invariant decision rule for the systematic part of ina-
tion, models that make unemployment depend on a distributed lag of ination are observationally
equivalent with ones that make unemployment depend on a distributed lag of surprises in ination.
That result seems to suggest that our three models should be dicult to distinguish, but in fact
there are two sources of information that inform the posterior probabilities it. One involves a
distinction between variation within and across monetary regimes. Although our models are obser-
vationally equivalent within a monetary regime, they are not equivalent across regimes, because the
Lucas-Sargent model says that the equilibrium law of motion for unemployment is invariant across
policy rules while the Keynesian models say it is not. In the calculations reported below, xtjt 1 is
formed not from a time-invariant decision rule but from one that changes from period to period.
The weight on the Lucas-Sargent model rises when new data support the invariance property, and
it falls when they do not. The second force for change in it is parsimony. The Solow-Tobin model
is nested within the Samuelson-Solow model but has fewer parameters, and our calculations credit
that parsimony. If new data suggest the Solow-Tobin model ts about as well, then its posterior
weight will rise relative to the Samuelson-Solow model. During an age before the advent of non-
parametric (i.e., innite-parametric) models, Arthur Goldberger is reputed often to have warned
against proliferating free parameters. Robert Lucas (1981, p. 188) said that \ ::: it is useful, in a
general way, to be hostile toward theorists bearing free parameters." Our Bayesian calculations are
hostile toward additional free parameters.
11
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 478
April 2005in yt is costly and there are no osetting benets in terms of reduced variation in ut,
the optimal policy within this model is xLS
tjt 1 = 0:11
2.3 The central bank's decision making process
Now we turn to the details of the central bank's decision process. The rst of the
bank's three tasks is to update parameter estimates for each of its approximating mod-
els. Within each model, the central bank's identifying assumptions make equations






where 2 is the variance of Phillips curve residuals. The marginal prior p(2) makes
the error variance an inverse gamma variate, and the conditional prior p(j2) makes
the regression parameters a normal random vector. Along with this, we assume
that the Phillips curve residuals it are identically and independently distributed
and conditionally normal given the right-hand variables. These assumptions make
the conditional likelihood function normal. With a normal-inverse gamma prior and
a Gaussian conditional likelihood, the posterior also belongs to the normal-inverse
gamma family, and its parameters can be updated recursively.
In particular, let Zt summarize the joint history of (Xt;Yt) up to date t. Before










where t 1;Pt 1;st 1; and t 1 represent estimates based on data through period t 1:
The variable Pt 1 is a precision matrix, st 1 is a scale parameter for the inverse-gamma
density, and vt 1 counts degrees of freedom. The estimate of 2 is just st 1=vt 1: After
11See Stokey (1989) for a discussion of time inconsistency problems in terms of alternative timing
protocols. See Sargent (1999, chapter 3) for an application of Stokey's analysis to the Phillips curve.
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t (Pt 1t 1 + XtYt);







vt = vt 1 + 1:
The posterior for date t becomes the prior for date t + 1:
The second task the central bank performs each period is to revise the model
probability weights. For the normal-inverse gamma family, this can also be done
recursively. Let i0 = p(Mi) represent the prior probability on model i. The posterior
weight on model i is dened as
it =
wit
w1t + w2t + w3t
(12)
where wit is an unnormalized model weight. In an unpublished appendix available
on the RED web site, we show that Bayes's theorem implies the following recursion
for wit;
















i )   logp(i;2
ijZt
i) is the change in the log posterior that results
from a new observation. These are easy to calculate for the normal-inverse gamma
family.12 The central bank uses the probability weights it in its policy deliberations.
From conditions (11) and (13), one can see that the central bank's approximating
models are built for tractability. So long as the models remain within the normal-
inverse gamma family, updates of parameters and model weights are quite simple.
12Analytical expressions for these terms can be found in the appendix.
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then at every date we would have to integrate numerically a high-dimensional poste-
rior density for each model, and that would be very costly to compute. For tractabil-
ity, we want to remain within a conjugate family, and the normal-inverse gamma
family is a natural choice for this problem.
The central bank's third task each period is to solve an optimal control problem
that takes the form of a discounted stochastic linear quadratic dynamic programming
problem, i.e., a so-called optimal linear regulator problem. In forming this problem,
we ascribe the type of adaptive behavior contained in models of Kreps (1998) and
Sargent (1999). In particular, when reformulating its policy rule each period, we as-
sume the central bank treats the estimated parameters of its approximating models
as if they were constants rather than random variables that come from a sequen-
tial estimation process. This behavioral assumption has two consequences. First, it
means that decision rules depend only on point estimates and not posterior variances
or higher moments, so it deactivates a concern for parameter uncertainty within each
approximating model, an element of the problem emphasized by Brainard (1967).
Second, it also ignores the connection between today's policy and tomorrow's in-
formation ow, a link that provides a motive for experimentation in the models of
Wieland (2000a,b) and Beck and Wieland (2002). Thus, our central bank adheres
to the prescriptions of Blinder (1998) and Lucas (1981) that the central bank should
resist the temptation to run experiments that will help it learn about the structure of
the economy.13 Nevertheless, experimentation that emerges from benevolent motives
but mistaken beliefs is a decisive feature of our story.
13Blinder (p. 11) states \while there are some fairly sophisticated techniques for dealing with
parameter uncertainty in optimal control models with learning, those methods have not attracted
the attention of either macroeconomists or policymakers. There is a good reason for this inattention,
I think: You don't conduct policy experiments on a real economy solely to sharpen your econometric
estimates." Lucas (1981, p. 288) remarks: \Social experiments on the grand scale may be instructive
and admirable, but they are best admired at a distance. The idea, if the marginal social product
of economics is positive, must be to gain some condence that the component parts of the program
are in some sense reliable prior to running it at the expense of our neighbors."
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Sit+j = Ai(t   1)Sit+j 1 + Bi(t   1)xt+jjt 1 + Ci(t   1)it+j (14)
where (Sit;Ai(t   1);Bi(t   1);Ci(t   1)) are the state vector and system arrays for
model i at time t. The system arrays are evaluated at the point estimates that emerge
from equation (11). The details for each model are spelled out in the appendix. One
point that bears emphasis is that arriving at this specication involves inverting the
Keynesian Phillips curves to express them in terms of the classical direction of t. In
other words, after estimating (5) and (6), we re-arrange to put unemployment on the
left-hand side and current ination on the right. This puts the Keynesian models in
a form in which it is sensible to imagine controlling ut and yt via settings for xtjt 1.
We emphasize that although the regressions that produce the Samuelson-Solow and
the Solow-Tobin models both have yt on the left side, the government always regards
ination as under its control via equation (2).14 Thus, xtjt 1 is the common time t
instrument of the monetary authority in all three of the models. The mechanics are
spelled out in the appendix.











where Mi denotes model i, Msi is a selection matrix that picks out the targets (yt;ut)
from the state vector Sit; Q and R are positive semidenite weighting matrices that
penalize deviations from the target and variation in the instrument, and xt+jjt 1 is







to reect the relative weights on unemployment and ination, respectively. We also
set R equal to 0.001, mostly for computational reasons.15
14Again, see King and Watson (1994) for a discussion of the consequences and interpretations of
alternative directions of t in the empirical Phillips curve literature.
15This allows us to use a doubling algorithm to solve the optimal linear regulator problem. The
doubling algorithm requires a positive denite R; and we would have to use slower algorithms if R
were 0. See Anderson et.al. (1996) for a discussion of the doubling algorithm and its properties vis
a vis alternative algorithms.
To cast the central bank's problem as an optimal linear regulator, we rst write
15
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the model-specic constraints as
SEt+j = AE(t   1)SEt+j 1 + BE(t   1)xt+jjt 1 + CE(t   1)t; (17)
where SEt = [S0
1t;S0
2t;S0
3t]0; t = [1t;2t;3t]0; and
AE(t   1) =
2
4
A1(t   1) 0 0
0 A2(t   1) 0
0 0 A3(t   1)
3
5; (18)








CE(t   1) =
2
4
C1(t   1) 0 0
0 C2(t   1) 0
0 0 C3(t   1)
3
5:
The composite transition equation (17) encompasses the three submodels.
The central bank's loss function can also be written in this notation. After aver-
aging across models, the expected loss is





















Notice how QEt, the weighting matrix in the complete model, counts each model in
proportion to its posterior probability. The weights vary from period to period as the
models become more or less plausible in light of new data.
The central bank chooses a decision rule for xtjt 1 by minimizing its expected loss
(equation 19) subject to the constraint implied by the composite transition equation
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to the distribution of t in (17). This problem takes the form of an optimal linear
regulator. The optimal decision rule takes the form






If the composite model is `detectable' and `stabilizable,' then the policy rule fE can be
computed using standard algorithms (e.g., see Sargent 1980 and Anderson, Hansen,
McGratten, and Sargent 1996).16
Detectability and stabilizability also guarantee that the closed-loop matrix (AE  
BEfE) has eigenvalues less than  1=2 in magnitude, thus ensuring that LE is nite.
Assuming that the posterior probability weights are all strictly positive, this means
that each submodel also has nite expected loss under the optimal rule. In other
words, an optimal policy simultaneously stabilizes all the submodels.
This is not necessarily the case under an arbitrary policy rule. If a policy fails
to stabilize one of the submodels, so that the closed-loop matrix associated with
that model has an eigenvalue greater than  1=2 in absolute value, then the expected
loss is innite, both for that submodel and for the complete model. A Bayesian
linear regulator avoids such rules, even if the unstable submodel has a low probability
weight, because a small probability weight cannot counterbalance an innite expected
loss.
From this observation there emerges a connection with the minimax approach.
An unstabilized submodel is a bad outcome against which a Bayesian linear regulator
wants to guard. That submodel exerts an inuence on the choice of policy that is
disproportionate to its probability weight. As in the minimax approach, preventing
disasters, even those expected to occur with low probability, is the rst priority for
policy.
A Bayesian linear regulator who is permitted endlessly to proliferate submodels
could become paralyzed because the encompassing model may become unstabilizable
16Our computer programs always check these conditions.
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contains several unusual elements, there may exist no f that simultaneously stabilizes
them all. One solution, proposed by Madigan and Raftery (1994), uses `Occam's
window' to exclude submodels with posterior probability below some threshold. This
threshold is the analog to the multiplier parameter  that restrains the activity of the
`evil agent' in the robust control approach described by Hansen and Sargent (2001).
The problem of paralysis does not arise in our application because we consider
three conventional Phillips curve specications. For the calculations reported below,
the composite model is always detectable and stabilizable. But it could be relevant
in other applications.
3 A statistical history of thought and policy
The free parameters in this model are the initial probability weights, i0; the
central bank's initial priors on parameters of each approximating model, and the
parameters  and  that govern its loss function. Everything else is updated recur-
sively, via equations (11) and (13). In principle, these parameters could be estimated
by GMM or MLE, but our empirical exploration consists of a calibration. We set
plausible values for the free parameters, turn on the recursions with actual data for
ination and unemployment, and see what we get.
The data are standard. Ination is measured by the log dierence in the chain-
weighted GDP deator, and unemployment is the civilian unemployment rate.17
Both series are quarterly and seasonally adjusted, and they span the period 1948.Q1
through 2002.Q4.
To set initial priors for the central bank's approximating models, we use estimates
taken from the rst 12 years of data, 1948-1959, with an allowance for lags at the
beginning of the sample.18 The lag order for each model is summarized in table
17We also tried CPI ination and the unemployment rate for white males aged 20 years or more,
but they resulted in undetectable, unstabilizable systems, which undermines theorems guaranteeing
convergence of Riccati equation iterations.
18The Lucas-Sargent model requires that we make an assumption about the evolution of xt in the
18
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with the current value plus two lags of unemployment. In the Lucas-Sargent model,
unemployment is assumed to be AR(2), perturbed by the current value of unexpected
ination, yt xtjt 1. These choices of lag length emerged after some experimentation.
They compromise parsimony and t.19
The Solow-Tobin and Lucas-Sargent specications involve ut   u
t, the gap be-
tween actual unemployment and the natural rate. It would be best to treat u
t as
unobservable, adding an optimal ltering step to the bank's deliberations, but doing
so would substantially complicate our updating procedure. Instead, we prefer to con-
struct an observable proxy. Thus, we measure the natural rate of unemployment by





t 1 + g(ut   u

t 1); (23)
with the gain parameter g = 0:075:20 The natural rate series was initialized by setting
u
t = ut in 1948.Q1. This is a rough and ready way to track movements in the natural
rate.21 In its defense, one important feature is that it is a one-sided low-pass lter
that preserves the integrity of the information ow to the central bank. In contrast,
a two-sided lter would allow the authorities to peek at the future of unemployment.
The parameters i0; i = 1;2;3; were set equal to the point estimates from the
initial regressions, the precision matrix Pi0 equal to the appropriate X0X matrix;
training sample. Within the training sample, we generate xt from xt = xt 1 + :075(yt   xt 1) with
initial condition x0 set to the initial rate of ination y0 in the sample. Outside the training sample,
we use our model-generated xtjt 1 as xt in the Lucas-Sargent Phillips curve.
19In principle, one could account for uncertainty about lag lengths by proliferating submodels,
taking one for each possible lag specication, but that would result in many submodels. It would
probably also multiply the number of worst-case models at any time, for when one lag specication
is ill-behaved other nearby specications are also likely to be ill-behaved. Occam's window is likely
to be helpful in such cases. How best to implement that is an open question.
20Note that this is simply a measurement equation that we use. It is not part of the model used
by the central bank. In particular, the central bank does not believe that it can manipulate u
t.




Working Paper Series No. 478
April 2005si0 is the residual sum of squares and i0 is the degrees of freedom. Since the rst
12 years of the sample are used to set priors, 1959.Q4 becomes date zero, and the
recursions begin in 1960.Q1.
In addition to setting the parameters of the central bank's prior, we must also ini-
tialize the model weights, i0:22 Because the Solow-Tobin and Lucas-Sargent models
were yet to be invented, we put most of the initial weight on the Samuelson-Solow
model. Thus, we set 10 = 0:98 and 20 = 30 = 0:01: The results are insensi-
tive to this choice, primarily because the data quickly come to dominate posterior
probabilities.
Finally, we adopt standard values for the parameters of the central bank's loss
function. The discount factor, ; is set at 1:04 1=4; reecting an annual discount rate
of 4 percent. The weight on ination, , is set equal to 16, reecting an equal weight
with unemployment when ination is measured at an annual rate. The results are
not sensitive to plausible changes in  or :23
These parameters initialize the recursions. On the basis of information avail-
able through 1959.Q4, our hypothetical central bank prepares a contingency plan
for 1960.Q1 and sets x1 accordingly. Then we give it data on actual ination and
unemployment for 1960.Q1. The central bank re-estimates its models in light of the
new information, re-evaluates their probability weights, and revises its policy rule for
xtjt 1. The bank continues in this fashion, updating one quarter at a time, through
2002.Q4. The results of their calculations are summarized below.
Figure 1 illustrates the puzzle. The top panel shows the history of ination, and
the bottom portrays the evolution of model weights. The weight on the Lucas-Sargent
model is depicted by a solid line, the weight on the Samuelson-Solow by a dashed
line, and that on the Solow-Tobin model by a dashed and dotted line.
22The initial regression output cannot be used to set i0 because it represents a posterior derived
from a at prior. Relative model weights are indeterminate in this case, an instance of Lindley's
paradox. Thus, i0 must be set a priori.
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up in ination occurred at a time when the Samuelson-Solow model was dominant.
Indeed, its probability weight is visually indistinguishable from 1 between 1960 and
1970. But in the early 1970s, evidence began to pile up against the model, and
within 5 years its probability weight had fallen almost to zero. The data from those
years were persuasive because they contradicted a key prediction of the Samuelson-
Solow model, viz. that lower average unemployment could be attained at the cost of
higher average ination. Ination was trending higher in the early 1970s, but so was
unemployment. The policy experiment being run in those years was very informative
about the Samuelson-Solow model.
The Lucas-Sargent model emerged to take its place. Its model weight rose from
almost zero in the late 1960s, to approximately 0.5 by 1973, and then to almost 1 by
1975. It remained dominant until the early 1980s, after which it shared top billing
with the Solow-Tobin model. Yet the period of its dominance was also the time
when ination was highest. As explained above, our version of the Lucas-Sargent
model always recommends zero ination. How is it that the Federal Reserve, which
presumably weighs policy models according to their empirical plausibility, chose to
follow a high ination policy, at a time when the most plausible model recommended
low ination?
Although zero ination is always the recommendation of the Lucas-Sargent model,
it is not the recommendation of the system as a whole. The policy actions recom-
mended by our Bayesian linear regulator are shown as dashed lines in gure 2, along
with the history of actual ination, which is portrayed by a solid line. For the most
part, the path for xtjt 1 tracks the general prole of yt, but in the critical, middle
period it is often higher and more volatile than actual ination. Indeed, for the
1970s, the recommendations of the Bayesian linear regulator are far from those of the
The main features of the top panel are familiar. Ination rose gradually during the
21
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The next two gures provide clues about why the Bayesian linear regulator be-
haves this way. Figure 3 shows the expected loss associated with a zero ination
policy (i.e., f = 0) in each of the submodels and for the system as a whole. Solid
lines record the expected loss when it is nite, and open spaces represent an innite
expected loss. The open spaces are key features.
A zero ination policy may have been optimal for the Lucas-Sargent model, but
it would have been dreadful if implemented in the Keynesian models. Not until 1985
was the expected loss nite under zero ination in both the Samuelson-Solow and
Solow-Tobin models. The expected loss for the system as a whole is a probability
weighted average of the losses in the submodels, and it is innite whenever one of the
submodel losses is. Therefore, the expected loss under the complete model was also
innite for most of this period, despite the Lucas-Sargent model's high probability
weight.
With f = 0, an innite expected loss occurs when an eigenvalue of Ai exceeds
 1=2 in magnitude. Figure 4 shows recursive estimates of the dominant eigenvalue
for each submodel, along with the stability boundary  1=2. The dominant eigenvalue
of AE is the upper envelope of the values for the submodels. The Solow-Tobin model
was unstable under the zero ination f = 0 policy prior to 1976, and the Samuelson-
Solow model was unstable for most of the period from 1975 until 1985. Hence, for
most of the period prior to 1985, one or both of the Keynesian submodels would have
been unstable under a zero ination policy, and so the complete model also would
have been unstable.24
24Figure 4 reveals that during the 1970's there is one date at which the dominant eigenvalues of the
Samuelson-Solow and the Solow-Tobin models both exceed  1=2. At that date, xtjt 1 spikes upward
in Figure 2. A few quarters later, there is a single date at which the eigenvalues of both of those
Lucas-Sargent model, even though its weight was close to 1. If anything, this gure
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employment outcomes required that policy feedback in the proper way on the state,
and that failing to run policy in an appropriate activist way could destabilize unem-
ployment. DeLong (1997) describes this view as a legacy of the Great Depression.
This view emerges from the following pair of gures that compare expected outcomes
under the optimal model-weighted policy25 with those under zero ination at two
points in the 1970s. In gure 5, the forecast date is 1975.Q4, and in gure 6 it is
1979.Q4. Solid lines portray forecasts of unemployment under zero ination, dashed
lines depict forecasts of unemployment under the optimal policy, and the dashed and
dotted lines show expected ination under the optimal model-weighted policy.26
In the Lucas-Sargent model, expected unemployment is the same under the two
rules, reecting the irrelevance of the systematic part of policy for real variables. In
the Keynesian submodels, however, projections for unemployment dier dramatically
across rules. In the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models, a zero-ination policy
triggers Depression levels of unemployment, an outcome that is very costly indeed.
In contrast, Keynesian projections of unemployment are more ordinary under the
optimal policy.
The projection for optimal ination27 calls for a gradual disination. For exam-
ple, starting in 1975.Q4 ination is expected to decline from 7.75 to 6.25 percent
over a period of 2 years. Slightly more disination is expected in 1979.Q4, with
ination forecasts falling from 9.75 to 6.25 percent. But in both cases, ination re-
mains well above the Lucas-Sargent optimal value even after 2 years. The central
models become less than  1=2. At that lonely date, xtjt 1 closely approximates the zero-ination
recommendation of the Lucas model.
25I.e., the policy produced by our Bayesian linear regulator.
26Expected ination is of course zero under a zero ination policy.
27This is the same in all submodels because there is a single policy rule.
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in the Keynesian scenarios albeit at the cost of worsening the ination outlook in the
Lucas-Sargent model. The Bayesian linear regulator accepts this tradeo. From his
perspective, a worsening of the ination outlook is a price worth paying to prevent a
recurrence of the Depression.28
Furthermore, notice how closely the composite forecast tracks the Lucas-Sargent
model projection. This reects the high probability weight on the Lucas-Sargent
model at that time. The Bayesian linear regulator accepts higher ination to prevent
a Depression, even though he thinks it will occur with low probability, because a
Depression is a truly dreadful outcome. One may object that this concern was mis-
placed because it was so unlikely, and judging by the posterior model weights it was
very unlikely. Yet our Bayesian linear regulator was unwilling to risk the possibility
in exchange for the comparatively modest benets of low ination. The Bayesian
linear regulator disregards the recommendation of the Lucas-Sargent model because
there is a positive probability that it would have resulted in unbounded loss. The
Lucas-Sargent optimal policy was not robust to the possibility that the data were
generated by a Keynesian model.
In this instance, the Bayesian linear regulator behaves like a minimax controller,
putting more weight on the recommendations of worst-case models than on that of the
most likely model. Figure 7 illustrates this by comparing the optimal Bayesian policy
with that of each submodel. For a discounted quadratic loss function such as ours,
the worst-case scenario under a given policy rule is an unstabilized submodel. Before
1975, the Solow-Tobin model was the worst case, as it was the only submodel unstable
under zero ination. After 1977, the Samuelson-Solow model became the worst case,
because then it was the unique submodel unstable under zero ination. Notice how
28This preference for gradualism helps resolve a puzzle about the correlation between the mean
and persistence of ination. The escape route models of Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams, and
Sargent (2002) predict an inverse correlation, but Cogley and Sargent (2001, 2005) estimate a positive
correlation. The model sketched here is broadly consistent with that estimate. The Bayesian linear
regulator wants to reduce ination in the 1970s, but he moves very slowly. Thus, when ination
was highest, the optimal policy called for a very gradual adjustment toward the target, making
deviations from the target persistent.
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model when it is the worst case, and then switches to that of the Samuelson-Solow
model when it becomes unstable. The most likely model has little inuence compared
with the worst-case models.29
In the model, it is literally an explosive root that causes the Bayesian linear regu-
lator to shy away from a zero-ination policy. The policy rule must cancel explosive
roots to stabilize a system, so the Bayesian linear regulator pays special attention to
the blocks of AE in equation (17) in which explosive roots reside. All other considera-
tions are secondary in comparison with losses arising from an unstabilized submodel.
But this should be interpreted metaphorically. We suspect that conditional forecasts
like those in gures 5 and 6 would be enough to deter real-world policy makers. Expec-
tations that unemployment would exceed 15 percent for several years would probably
be sucient to dissuade the authorities from pursuing a cold-turkey disination.
3.1 Direction of t
The direction-of-t issue discussed by King and Watson (1994) is important in un-
derstanding how some of Primiceri's (2003) results relate to ours.30 Like us, Primiceri
emphasizes how monetary policy changed as the authorities updated their estimates,
and he also attributes the ination of the 1970s to the high perceived sacrice ratio
that Keynesian Phillips curve models presented to policy makers. But Primiceri as-
sumes that the Fed relied exclusively on a version of the Solow-Tobin model and does
not address why they disregarded the recommendations of the Lucas-Sargent model.
29The spike in xt in 1975 represents the central bank's best response to a special challenge.
The spike occurs during a brief window when both Keynesian submodels were unstable under zero
ination, forcing the central bank to address two `worst-case' models at the same time. An extreme
setting for xt was needed simultaneously to stabilize both. The spike might seem implausible until
one remembers that ination actually did reach levels like this in other developed economies. For
example, ination in the U.K. peaked at 32 percent around that time.
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robust prediction across models. On the contrary, it depends critically on the direction
of t. For example, the following table reports sacrice ratios estimated from our
three models, along with two other specications that invert the Samuelson-Solow and
Solow-Tobin models to put unemployment on the left-hand side and current ination
on the right. Here the sacrice ratio refers to the cumulative output loss associated
with reducing ination by one percentage point relative to the inherited value and
holding it there for 8 quarters. We project the consequences for unemployment in each
model and then approximate the output loss using Okun's law that each percentage
point of extra unemployment corresponds to 2.5 percent of foregone GDP.
Perceptions about the cost of disination vary a lot across models. The two
Keynesian specications, labeled SS-K and ST-K, have huge sacrice ratios, ranging
from around one-quarter of a year's GDP to almost three-fths. On the other hand,
sacrice ratios are close to zero in Phillips curve models estimated with the classical
direction of t. Notice that this is true not only of the Lucas-Sargent model but also
of the inverted Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin representations, which are labeled
SS-C and ST-C, respectively. Indeed, the direction of t matters more than the
qualitative nature of the tradeo.
The reason that the sacrice ratios dier so much has to do with how the models
interpret a near-zero contemporaneous covariance between ination and unemploy-
ment. In the early 1970s, this covariance moved downward toward zero, altering
perceptions about the cost of disination. In a Keynesian Phillips curve, this dimin-
ished covariance attens the short-term tradeo, making the authorities believe that
a long spell of high unemployment would be needed to bring down ination, prompt-
ing Keynesian modelers to be less inclined to disinate. But for a classical Phillips
curve, the shift toward a zero covariance steepens the short-term tradeo, making
the authorities believe that ination could be reduced at less cost in terms of higher
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disinate.
Classical versions of the Phillips curve were competitive in terms of t, so it
appears puzzling that so much weight would be put on the lessons of one model
and so little on the others. Our story explains this by emphasizing a concern for
robustness. Models predicting a high sacrice ratio are weighed heavily for policy
not because they dominate in terms of t (they do not), but because they represent
worst-case scenarios against which a prudent central bank wants to guard.
3.2 Sensitivity to discounting
When calculating expected loss at date t, the Bayesian linear regulator imagines
that he will follow today's rule forever, despite knowing that the rule will be revised
tomorrow in light of new information. In other words, he pretends a permanent
commitment to the rule, when he knows it is only a temporary attachment. A
short term perspective might better reect the mutability of policy rules. One way
to shorten the planner's perspective, while remaining within the framework of an
optimal linear regulator, is to reduce the discount factor . This shifts weight away
from losses expected to occur far into the future, when today's policy rule is less likely
to be in eect, toward outcomes expected in the near future, when today's rule is
likely to be more relevant.
In principal, this can matter for robustness because it expands the region within
which a submodel has nite expected loss, thus enlarging the role of model probability
weights. Figure 8 shows, however, that the basic picture is insensitive to changes in
. The gure portrays the Bayesian choice of xtjt 1 for discount rates of 4, 8, 12, 16,
and 20 percent per annum, respectively.
The general contour of optimal policy is altered only slightly by an increase in
the discount rate. One dierence is that a brief window opens in 1975-76 during
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submodels cross into the stable region for a few quarters, making the Bayesian linear
regulator less concerned about achieving a bounded loss and more concerned about
performance. As a consequence, he can pursue the Lucas-Sargent policy with less
concern for its down-side risk. For lower values of , xtjt 1 is also slightly lower in the
late 1970s and slightly higher after 1985, but none of these dierences is especially
important relative to the big picture.
One can of course eliminate a concern for robustness by discounting at a su-
ciently high rate. This would require setting the discount factor so that 1=2 times
the largest eigenvalue of AE is always less than 1. In the mid-1970s, the largest eigen-
value of AE was approximately 1.2, so  would have to be around 1:2 2 = 0:69 to
accomplish this. But this corresponds to a 45 percent quarterly discount rate, which
strains the interpretation that policy is set by intertemporal optimization. If we take
the recursive model estimates as given, it seems dicult to dismiss a concern about
unbounded losses in this way.
3.3 Sensitivity to prior model weights
The model's policy recommendations are also insensitive to the prior model weights.
The baseline results are predicated on the assumption that SS(0) = 0:98 and
ST(0) = LS(0) = 0:01; reecting that the Solow-Tobin and Lucas-Sargent models
were developed later. Here we examine how the results change when the Solow-Tobin
model is given greater initial weight. We hold LS(0) constant at 0:01 and increase
ST(0) by borrowing from SS(0): Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the results.
The prior is informative, so changes in ST(0) alter views about which model
is most likely at a given time. This inuence is depicted in gure 9, which portrays
posterior model weights for four scenarios. The dashed, dashed-dotted, and solid lines
represent, respectively, the posterior weights on the Samuelson-Solow, Solow-Tobin,
and Lucas-Sargent models. The top-left panel reproduces the baseline case from
gure 1, and the other three panels increase ST(0) to 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6, respectively.
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Sargent models. In the other panels, the prior odds ratio increases to 20, 40, and 60,
respectively, in favor of the Solow-Tobin model.
Two features are robust to this change, but one is not. In all four cases, the
Samuelson-Solow model remains dominant in the 1960s, and the Lucas-Sargent model
still has the highest probability weight for most of the 1970s and early 1980s. What
changes is the ordering after the Volcker disination. As the prior odds on the Solow-
Tobin model increase, its posterior weight catches up with and surpasses that on the
Lucas-Sargent model. In this respect, the results are sensitive to initial values.
Figure 10 shows how this alters the Bayesian policy recommendation. The solid
line reproduces the baseline calculation, and the other lines show how xtjt 1 varies
as ST(0) increases. There is virtually no dierence, especially during the Great
Ination.31 At that time, the Bayesian regulator was heavily inuenced by concerns
about worst-case scenarios, and since the identity of worst-case models does not
depend on probability weights, it follows that changes in model weights have little
inuence on policy recommendations. In this respect, the results are insensitive to
assumptions about the central bank's prior.
3.4 Anatomy of stabilization
Why, then, did ination nally fall? In part, the answer is that recursive estimates
of the Keynesian submodels eventually crossed into a region in which zero ination
was safe, so that concerns about robustness no longer dominated the choice of policy
rule. By the 1990s, estimates of the Samuelson-Solow and Solow-Tobin models no
31Ination is slightly lower after the Volcker disination because the increase in ST(0) comes at
the expense of a decrease in SS(0): This drives the posterior probability on the Samuelson-Solow
model close to zero in the 1980s and 1990s, and that pushes down xtjt 1:
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This is shown in gures 11 and 12, which provide two examples of forecasts from
the Greenspan era. They have the same format as gures 5 and 6, but they advance
the forecast dates to 1992.Q4 and 2002.Q4, respectively. By then, circumstances had
become quite dierent from those in the 1970s.
Unemployment outcomes still dier across policy rules in the Keynesian submod-
els, but the dierence is much less dramatic. Unemployment is higher under zero
ination, but now only by a few percentage points, and the forecasts do not approach
the levels that earlier vintages of the same models predicted. Because the Bayesian
linear regulator is less concerned about the risk of Depression, he is no longer willing
to tolerate high and persistent ination. Instead, he moves closer to zero ination.
The Lucas-Sargent model no longer has a probability close to one, however, so the
optimal policy represents a compromise between zero ination and Keynesian choices.
According to our calculations, the key dierence between the 1970s and 1990s
relates to concerns about a recurrence of the Depression. By the 1990s, this concern
was substantially alleviated, allowing the Bayesian linear regulator to focus more on
ination.
4 `Triumph' versus `vindication'
Our ndings blend aspects of two competing stories that Sargent (1999) told about
Volcker's conquest of U.S. ination. The `triumph of the natural rate' story has the
monetary authority commit itself to keeping ination low once it has accepted the
rational expectations version of the natural rate theory. The `vindication of econo-
metric policy evaluation' story has the monetary authority remain unaware of the
rational expectations version of the natural rate theory but nevertheless be induced
to ght ination after data render revised estimates of a Samuelson-Solow Phillips
curve consistent with an imperfect version of the natural rate hypothesis. The im-
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to cause an optimal control problem called the Phelps problem32 to recommend low
ination.33
The triumph story has the central banker being persuaded by theoretical argu-
ments to embrace a dogmatic prior favoring the rational expectations version of the
natural rate hypothesis. The vindication story is about how the U.S. ination ex-
perience of the 1960s and 1970s induces an erroneously specied econometric model
coupled with a control problem that violates the Lucas critique to give approximately
correct advice.
Our empirical results weave together aspects of both stories because even after
the evidence in favor of the Lucas version of the natural rate hypothesis becomes
very strong, our Bayesian linear regulator does not become dogmatic { he still at-
taches positive, albeit small, probabilities to mostly discredited hypotheses. As we
have stressed, those discredited hypotheses continue to exert a powerful inuence on
policy so long as they predict that very adverse outcomes would follow from adopt-
ing the policy recommendation that would ow from attaching probability one to
the Lucas model. Our story requires that the Samuelson-Solow and the Solow-Tobin
specications both have to indicate less than disastrous outcomes before the Bayesian
linear regulator can embrace recommendations that ow from the Lucas theory.34
32When the probability assigned to the Samuelson-Solow model is one, our Bayesian linear regu-
lator problem becomes identical with the Phelps problem.
33Sargent's `vindication' story took for granted that the Samuelson-Solow Phillips curve is mis-
specied, that the Phelps problem is subject to the Lucas critique, and that the data truly are
generated by the rational expectations version of the natural rate hypothesis.
34The present paper is silent about self-conrming equilibria and escape routes, important ingre-
dients of the analyses in Sargent (1999), Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2001), Sargent and Williams
(2003), and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2004). Those papers endow the government with a single
model, the Samuelson-Solow model. That model is incorrect out of equilibrium but correct in a
self-conrming equilibrium. To conquer ination, it is necessary to escape from the self-conrming
equilibrium. Such escapes recur, punctuated by returns to the self-conrming equilibrium. Sargent
(1999) attempted to interpret the conquest of U.S. ination as an escape episode that is bound to
be temporary unless the government adopts a better specication of the Phillips curve. It would be
an interesting and non-trivial exercise to extend that work to a setting in which the government is
endowed with the mixture of models possessed by our Bayesian linear regulator. In a self-conrming
equilibrium, the Lucas and Samuelson-Solow models are observationally equivalence. That might
make it possible that the Samuelson-Solow model would not be discarded in the long run.
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One popular interpretation of the rise and fall of U.S. ination during the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s emphasizes the central bank's changing beliefs about the natural
rate hypothesis: the central bank conquered ination because data generated by its
own earlier misguided attempts to exploit the Phillips curve convinced it to accept
the natural rate theory. But if the evolution of the central bank's beliefs were all that
mattered, what postponed the conquest of ination until the 1980s? The data had
revealed the natural rate property by the early 1970s.
Our paper assembles evidence that conrms this timing puzzle. Using recursive
Bayesian techniques, we nd that posterior probabilities strongly favored a version
of the Lucas-Sargent model as early as 1975. Nevertheless, the central bank did
not implement that model's recommendations for ination. This paper shows that
a concern for robustness across a variety of models can explain why. According to
our calculations, despite its high probability weight, the Lucas-Sargent model had
little inuence on policy because its recommendations were not robust across some
other recently popular models. The central bank could agree with Lucas and Sargent
about the workings of the economy, yet it could also refrain from adopting their policy
recommendations because of its fears about the downside risk. In light of what we
know now, say as represented by smoothed estimates of the approximating models,
those fears may seem silly, but they would not have seemed so silly to decision makers
armed with vintage-1970s estimates of Keynesian approximating models. On the
contrary, those models warned that high and rising unemployment would accompany
low ination.
In this connection, it is useful to read again the analyses of stagation that leading
policy economists presented in the late 1970s. For example, the contributors to Okun
and Perry's (1978) edited collection of essays all assign high probability to what we
would categorize as either the Samuelson-Solow or the Solow-Tobin specication, and
all of them take for granted that using monetary policy to reduce ination would entail
very large costs in terms of unemployment. Therefore they advocated alternative
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April 2005policy interventions (e.g., so called tax-based incomes policies). Okun and Perry
(1978) summarize things as follows:
\Thus, the mainline model and its empirical ndings rearm that there
is a slow-growth, high unemployment cure for ination, but that it is an
extremely expensive one. ... Using one of Perry's successful equations as
an example, an extra percentage point of unemployment would lower the
ination rate by only about 0.3 percentage point after one year and by
0.7 percentage point if maintained for three years. That extra point of
unemployment would cost over a million jobs and some $60 billion of real
production each year." (page 5)
Okun and Perry also summarize Perry's reasons for rejecting Fellner's suggestion that
much lower costs in terms of unemployment could be attained through a credible
disinationary policy:
Perry \believes that much of the [ination] inertia is backward-looking
rather than forward looking, and so is not susceptible to even convincing
demonstrations that demand will be restrained in the future. [Perry's] own
empirical evidence shows that wage developments are better explained in
terms of the recent past history of wages and prices than on any assump-
tion that people are predicting the future course of wages and prices in a
way that diers from the past." (page 6)
Perry (1978, pp. 50-51) forcefully elaborates on his argument against an expectational
interpretation of Phillips curve dynamics. Okun (1978a, p.284) says that \recession
will slow ination, but only at the absurd cost in production of roughly $200 billion
per point."35 At that time, $200 billion amounted to roughly 10 percent of GDP.
Ination averaged 7.4 percent from 1974 to 1979, and extrapolating to zero ination
implies a total cost of almost three-quarters of a year's GDP.
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April 2005Our Bayesian linear regulator attaches much lower probability to such outcomes
than Okun and Perry did. But even so, a prudent central bank would also have been
concerned about these outcomes and would have designed a policy that put a bound
on its losses. Our calculations suggest that the high ination of the 1970s was part
of such a policy, given the models of the Phillips curve that research in the 1960s had
presented to the central bank.
Our calculations also point to a connection between robust control theory and
Bayesian model averaging. Historically, robust control theory was motivated by con-
cerns about the stability of a system under a given decision rule and a perturbation
to an approximating model. Practical decision makers who used ordinary control the-
ory had found that controls that should have been optimal under the approximating
model actually destabilized a system, resulting in bad payos. Because instability
has catastrophic implications for a typical intertemporal objective function with little
or no discounting, control theorists sought decision rules that would assure stability
under a largest possible set of perturbations to an approximating model. This quest
led directly to H1 control theory. Concerns about system stability are also foremost
on the mind of our Bayesian linear regulator.
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Samuelson-Solow 1 : 4 2 : 2
Solow-Tobin 1 : 3 2 : 2
Lucas-Sargent 1 : 0 2 : 2
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ce Ratios and the Direction of Fit
SS-K ST-K SS-C ST-C LS
1970.Q4 0.295 0.607 0.036 0.014 0
1975.Q4 0.578 0.249 -0.009 0.006 0
1979.Q4 0.636 0.227 -0.008 0.007 0
Note: Percent output loss associated with a 1 percentage point reduction in ination sus-
tained for 8 quarters.
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Figure 1: Ination and Posterior Model Probabilities.
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Figure 2: Ination and Optimal Policy
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Figure 3: Expected Loss of a Zero Ination Policy
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Figure 4: Dominant Eigenvalue Under Zero Ination
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Figure 5: Optimal Policy v. Zero Ination, 1975.Q4
45
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 478



































Figure 6: Optimal Policy v. Zero Ination, 1979.Q4
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Figure 7: Optimal Policy and Policy for Worst-Case Scenarios
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Figure 8: Sensitivity of Bayesian Policy to the Discount Factor
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Figure 9: Sensitivity of Posterior Model Weights to Prior Model Weights
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Figure 10: Sensitivity of Bayesian Policy to Prior Model Weights
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Figure 11: Optimal Policy v. Zero Ination, 1992.Q4
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Figure 12: Optimal Policy v. Zero Ination, 2002.Q4
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